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There can be no doubt that the development of new means of 
communicating ideas through the internet, and even more so via social 
media, has vastly expanded the human archive of ideas and events.  
These textual, photographic, and audio-visual recordings are now 
available with a few keystrokes in a fraction of a second. All of this 
speech is virtually unfettered by government censorship under the First 
Amendment to the United States’ Constitution. The proliferation of this 
free speech tradition, and the democratic culture it nourishes, would be 
cause for unconstrained “dancing in the streets,”1 were it not for the 
presence of darker underbellies that accompany so much speech. Both 
new, and problematic versions of old, categories of speech challenge free 
speech principles within a democratic culture. It is not simply a matter 
of old forms of speech that are no “essential part of any exposition of 
 
 * Distinguished Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. 
 1. Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of the First 
Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 221 n.125 (quoting from a conversation with Alexander 
Meiklejohn praising the result in New York Times v. Sullivan). 
Crocker_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/31/2017  1:40 PM 
50 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC [Vol. 70:49 
ideas”2 finding a new home in the media platforms the internet makes 
possible.3 The social practices new digital media make possible can lead 
to new categories of speech—such as revenge pornography—capable of 
wrecking great harm on individual lives without colorable claim to 
participation in the free expression of ideas.4 Old categories of speech 
similarly comprising no part of the expression of ideas—such as 
incitement to unlawful activity—arise in new and far more dangerous 
contexts. Indeed, this marriage of old and new produces what Professor 
Alexander Tsesis addresses as the problem of terrorist speech on social 
media.5 
Professor Tsesis identifies a speech-related problem: terrorists 
and terrorist organizations recruit and indoctrinate through speech on 
the internet. Indoctrination can also include exhortation to commit 
violent actions. Professor Tsesis has a solution. He proposes a law 
authorizing government to criminalize speech based on its content, a 
law authorizing the complete suppression of the internet during 
specified emergencies, and seemingly by implication (though not his 
focus), a law authorizing government officials to force Internet Service 
Providers to take down offending content. The latter implication seems 
inevitable, because the former solution may add very little to the “war 
on terror,” since offending speakers exist beyond the jurisdiction of U.S. 
law. Professor Tsesis focuses, for example, on the availability of Anwar 
al-Awlaki’s lectures through social media, the circulation of “Inspire” (a 
publication disseminated by al-Qaeda), and the use of other interactive 
forums as examples of “terrorist speech” that pose security threats to 
the United States and others. This “terrorist speech” spreads 
propaganda and incites actions in ways Professor Tsesis argues may be 
regulated consistent with First Amendment principles and doctrine. 
The strength of the First Amendment’s free speech protections, even for 
politically dangerous speech, shapes his goal of articulating the 
doctrinal basis and guidelines for legislation regulating “internet-based 
terrorist incitement, propaganda, and indoctrination,”6 without 
running afoul of constitutional protections. Such legislation, he argues, 
“should prohibit imminently dangerous, truly threatening, and 
materially supportive forms of terrorist digital content.”7   
 
 2. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
 3. See generally Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of 
Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2004). 
 4. See, e.g., DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014); Mary Anne 
Franks & Danielle Keats Citron, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345 (2014). 
 5. Alexander Tsesis, Terrorist Speech on Social Media, 70 VAND. L. REV. 651 (2017). 
 6. Id. at 684. 
 7. Id. at 685. 
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This impulse to legislate against dangerous ideas is also part of 
a free speech tradition, but it often serves as a negative exemplar or an 
anti-canon, rather than an affirmative model to follow.8 From the use 
of the 1917 Espionage Act to suppress dissent during World War I,9 to 
the use of criminal syndicalism statutes to criminalize leftist political 
activity,10 to the use of the Smith Act to pursue communists purportedly 
bent on overthrowing the government through violence,11 the American 
free speech tradition is replete with the suppression of “dangerous 
ideas” later disavowed or judicially undercut.12 A proposal to “prohibit 
imminently dangerous . . . digital content”13 constituting “terrorist 
speech,” falls within this anti-tradition in free speech. In what follows, 
I will argue that the argument for re-engaging this anti-tradition is 
built on fatally imprecise conceptualizations, is factually unnecessary, 
and imposes a real danger to core constitutional values to achieve 
chimerical gains in security.   
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROBLEM  
WITH PROSCRIBING “TERRORIST SPEECH” 
It is a mistake, Professor Tsesis writes, “to believe that the Free 
Speech Clause does not enable government to prohibit violent political 
advocacy” of the kind that comprises “terrorist speech.”14 Why would 
such a belief be mistaken? He explores three First Amendment 
doctrines to arrive at the conclusion that a content-based law regulating 
“terrorist speech” could be constructed that does not violate the 
incitement standard in Brandenburg v. Ohio,15 is aimed at non-
protected “true threats,” or is “materially supportive” to a terrorist 
organization.  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Brandenburg, which defines 
the modern standard for incitement under the First Amendment, 
 
 8. See, e.g., Thomas P. Crocker, Dystopian Constitutionalism, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 593 
(2015); Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011); J.M. Balkin & Sanford 
Levinson, Commentary, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963, 1018–19 
(1998). 
 9. Espionage Act prosecutions were upheld in the inauspicious start of the American free 
speech tradition. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 
211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 
616 (1919). 
 10. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
 11. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
 12. For an account of this history, see GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH 
IN WARTIME (2004). 
 13. Tsesis, supra note 5, at 685. 
 14. Id. at 686. 
 15. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
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applies only to speech that poses an imminent threat of harm and “is 
hence of limited value to combat internet terrorist incitement,”16 in 
Professor Tsesis’ view. This conclusion follows because much of the 
“terrorist speech” he aims to regulate takes the form of “long term 
indoctrination, mentoring recruitment, and so on . . .”17  Under the 
Brandenburg standard, government can punish speech only where 
“such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless 
action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”18 The temporal 
horizon between the speech and the possibility of undertaking unlawful 
action requires a showing of immediacy. To avoid criminalizing abstract 
teaching of the general desirability of using violence, the link between 
speech and action cannot be speculative or indefinite. Although 
immediate incitement to commit terrorism might constitute one kind of 
“terrorist speech,” Professor Tsesis seeks to regulate the content of 
communications that exhort others to join the fight on behalf of the 
terrorist organization’s cause over a much longer temporal frame, and 
thus, do not constitute “incitement” under Brandenburg. Because the 
Supreme Court has also made clear in later cases that “the mere 
abstract teaching . . . of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for 
a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for 
violent action,”19 any showing of group incitement to future lawless 
action would also require immediacy, not “advocacy of the use of force 
or of law violation”20 shorn of imminence. Interestingly, when it came 
to the prosecution of Communist Party leaders in Dennis, the Court was 
willing to accept a lesser degree of imminence for First Amendment 
compliance due to the totalitarian menace posed by the Cold War. 21 
However, later cases such as Yates v. United States22 and Noto v. United 
States23 retreated from this lesser standard, as the court in Communist 
Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb clarified.24 Any attempt to circumvent the 
Brandenburg and Yates lines of cases by criminalizing “indoctrination,” 
“recruitment,” “dangerous menacing,” or “threatening” speech will run 
afoul of the First Amendment.25 
 
 16. Tsesis, supra note 5, at 667. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).  
 19. Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441, 448 (1974) (quoting 
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447–48. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
 22. 354 U.S. 298 (1957). 
 23. 367 U.S. 290 (1961). 
 24. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. at 448. 
 25. Oddly, Professor Tsesis seems to suggest that a line of cases exemplified by Brandenburg, 
in which the Supreme Court articulates robust limits on government censorship, might instead be 
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Second, when “terrorist speech” constitutes a true threat issued 
against specific individuals or groups, then it receives no First 
Amendment protection.26 As the Supreme Court explains, “true 
threats” “encompass those statements where the speaker means to 
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of 
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”27 
Because true threats can be proscribed on the basis of their content, a 
demanding First Amendment standard exists for imposing criminal 
liability. “True threats” are targeted to specific persons and have a 
scienter requirement, narrowing their application under the First 
Amendment to avoid criminalization of abstract or general advocacy of 
violence.28 “True threats” receive no First Amendment protection, in 
part, because of the specific harm they cause to those individuals to 
whom they are directed.29 Speech that expresses violence on social 
media sites such as Facebook is protected unless it can be shown to 
contain “any threat . . . to injure the person of another.”30 General 
encouragement of violence against unspecified persons would not meet 
this high bar, even if such expressions nonetheless might constitute 
“terrorist speech.” Because “true threats” can be criminalized only 
under narrowly drawn criteria, they comprise a narrow category of 
speech unlikely to provide a useful model for criminalizing “terrorist 
speech” more broadly.  
Finally, the Supreme Court upheld a content-based speech 
regulation that imposed criminal sanctions on non-violent political 
expression because of a seemingly reduced level of purported “strict 
scrutiny” it applied in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project.31 Finding 
no applicable First Amendment limitation, the Court concluded that 
 
judged for its “value to combat internet terrorist incitement,” Tsesis, supra note 5, at 667, inverting 
the First Amendment role of protecting against, rather than facilitating, government restrictions. 
 26. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992) (“[T]hreats of violence are outside 
the First Amendment . . . .”). 
 27. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). 
 28. See, e.g., Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015); Planned Parenthood of 
Columbia/Willamette v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1072 (9th Cir. 2002); United 
States v. Manning, 923 F.2d 83, 86 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 29. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388 (articulating “the reasons why threats of violence are outside 
the First Amendment (protecting individuals form the fear of violence, from the disruption that 
fear engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur)”). 
 30. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). 
 31. 561 U.S. 1 (2010); see David Cole, The First Amendment’s Borders: The Place of Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project in First Amendment Doctrine, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 147, 149 (2012) 
(“For the first time in its history, the Court upheld the criminalization of speech advocating only 
nonviolent, lawful ends on the ground that such speech might unintentionally assist a third party 
in criminal wrongdoing.”). For another critique of the Court’s reasoning, see Wadie E. Said, 
Humanitarian Law Project and the Supreme Court’s Construction of Terrorism, 2011 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1455 (2011). 
Crocker_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/31/2017  1:40 PM 
54 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC [Vol. 70:49 
Congress is free to regulate speech that coordinates with designated 
“foreign terrorist organizations” and their goals in a way that provides 
“material support.”32  By providing training, instruction, and teaching 
to designated foreign terrorist groups, the Humanitarian Law Project 
sought to promote the lawful, non-violent activities of groups through 
speech prohibited by the material support statute. On Professor Tsesis’ 
account, it is logical to conclude that “prohibiting individuals and 
groups from advancing the causes of terrorists is compelling,”33 which 
is true to the extent that the speech related means by which an 
individual advances the cause consists of providing “training, expert 
advice or assistance” that includes “instruction or teaching designed to 
impart a specific skill.”34 But the harm that Congress was empowered 
to avoid in the majority’s view in Humanitarian Law Project was “that 
providing material support to a designated foreign terrorist 
organization—even seemingly benign support—bolsters the terrorist 
activities of that organization.”35 Despite the plaintiff’s claims to 
support only the non-violent, humanitarian activities and goals of the 
designated organizations, the Court reasoned that Congress and the 
executive could conclude that such support lends inappropriate 
legitimacy to such organizations, frees other resources to pursue violent 
activities, and strains foreign relations. 
By contrast, the Court made clear that Congress is not 
empowered to proscribe independent speech by individuals “even if the 
Government were to show that such speech benefits foreign terrorist 
organizations.”36 Independent speech that benefits or furthers a foreign 
terrorist organization’s aims, under the Court’s reasoning, remains 
protected speech, despite the deference the Court grants the 
Government in protecting national security.37 With this distinction in 
place, speech made in coordination with a foreign terrorist organization 
that provides “training,” “expert advice,” or “service” can be proscribed. 
But under Humanitarian Law Project, the expressive activities of 
independent speakers, even if they advocate on behalf of the designated 
foreign terrorist organization’s interests, cannot be prohibited.  On the 
one hand, this distinction between coordinated and independent speech 
does nothing to address other justifications for proscribing speech 
supportive of terrorism. For example, when individuals engage in 
 
 32. 561 U.S.  at 38–39.  
 33. Tsesis, supra note 5, at 673. 
 34. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a). 
 35. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 36. 
 36. Id. at 39. 
 37. Id. at 36 (identifying “the sensitive interests in national security and foreign affairs at 
stake” as a basis for deference to the political branches). 
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speech that becomes one element in a conspiracy to commit acts of 
terrorism, constitutes a true threat, or incites others to commit group 
violence, then such speech is not protected whether it is independent or 
not. On the other hand, this distinction undermines the rationale for 
extending prohibitions on terrorist speech beyond existing categories of 
material support. For non-material speech supportive of a terrorist 
organization’s aims that does not fit one of these other narrowly drawn 
categories would receive full First Amendment protection. The current 
material-support framework already defines the outer boundaries of 
acceptable speech regulation. 
With these three doctrinal guideposts and a description of the 
ways that European democracies regulate speech constituting “public 
provocations,” Professor Tsesis concludes that we need a law that 
provides for “regulation of propaganda to incite terrorism, the 
intentional dissemination of serious expressions of violence directed at 
particular individuals or groups, and the solicitation or provision of 
assistance to designated terrorist organizations.”38 Regarding 
propaganda, he argues, that “[a]n imminently inciting posting is one 
that is highly probable to result in terrorist conduct. For example, 
where a person prods another on social media . . . to begin without delay 
a politically motivated attack.”39 If restricted to speech that is likely to 
incite such action, then, he thinks, abstract speech remains 
protected. Regarding material support, he claims that liability should 
be limited to persons who “aid terrorist groups, post materials on the 
internet, recruit others . . . or forward terrorist materials.”40 
The upshot of Professor Tsesis’ proposal is that, despite the 
seriousness of the threats that organized terrorism pose to democratic 
societies, the case for going very far beyond the existing legal 
frameworks is weak, given the strength of the free speech tradition’s 
limits on proscribing speech that is not causally and temporally 
proximate to the unlawful action. An open society must remain tolerant 
of “dangerous postings” based on the belief that unfettered and open 
dialogue is better than the risk of censorship.  One of the lessons one 
might reasonably draw from the Brandenburg line of cases is that 
American constitutionalism is generally skeptical of the attempt to 
categorize speech as dangerous in order to regulate it.  
 
 38. Tsesis, supra note 5, at 686. 
 39. Id. at 688. 
 40. Id. at 689. 
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II. CONCEPTUALIZING SPEECH 
Any attempt to route around First Amendment speech 
protections to justify restrictions on speech must begin with a specific 
description of the speech to be regulated. Apart from a vague conception 
that “terrorist speech” is dangerous speech, it is difficult to know 
precisely what speech Professor Tsesis’ proposal seeks to ban. To 
identify the relevant speech, a policy maker must also have a clear 
picture of the problem to be solved. 
What is the problem, precisely? Is it the existence of “[s]upport 
for terrorism on the internet,” or perhaps the “recruitment, 
indoctrination, and training” for which terrorist organizations make 
use of the internet?41 More narrowly, the problem might be “terrorist 
incitement” through social media.42 Similarly, it might be that 
terrorists “threaten, enlist, defame and call for brutal actions” via 
internet media.43 Sometimes the goal is presented as “restricting 
terrorist incitement or propaganda”44 to prevent “indoctrinations 
intended to recruit listeners to commit violent offenses.”45 Sometimes 
the concern is less the conjunction of incitement with propaganda, and 
more the simple “dissemination of propaganda,” or even the expression 
of “terrorist propaganda”—each of which may or may not include 
“[h]ighly dangerous menacing dogmas” that constitute “radical 
propaganda.”46 Still on other occasions in Professor Tsesis’ argument, 
the core concern is speech that is “threatening” or involves the 
“proliferation of menacing, indoctrinating, and organizing terrorist 
posts.”47 Finally, the worry could be about something seemingly very 
different: the need to empower government to “hold criminally 
accountable the creators, instigators, and facilitators of cyber terror.”48 
How such facilitation relates to “the intentional dissemination of 
serious expressions of violence”49 or  “imminently inciting posting[s]”50 
on social media is left unanswered. 
Each of these varying descriptions of the problem might reflect 
the concern that acts of terrorism are often perpetrated by individuals 
 
 41. Id. at 653. 
 42. Id. at 654, 657. 
 43. Id. at 656. 
 44. Tsesis, supra note 5, at 664. 
 45. Id. at 666. 
 46. Id. at 695. 
 47. Id. at 687. 
 48. Id. at 691. 
 49. Id. at 686. 
 50. Tsesis, supra note 5, at 688. 
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who are influenced by content conveyed via the internet. Actions follow 
ideas and beliefs. Perpetrators of terrorism, such as the Tsarnaev 
brothers who exploded bombs during the Boston Marathon,51 may have 
been motivated in part, or at least encouraged in their endeavors, by 
content they accessed on the internet. Because content that motivates 
and encourages crimes of terrorism exists, a policy maker might have 
reason to seek to eliminate, or at least dis-incentivize the dissemination 
of, such content. Beyond the general description of the problem, 
indoctrination into ideas is a very different issue from spreading 
propaganda—even “radical” propaganda—which in turn is different 
from organizing social media postings. Moreover, beyond the fact that 
information, opinions, and social media content can play a causal role 
in affirming or reinforcing beliefs, the real problem is the perpetration 
of violent acts, not merely the circulation of communicative content, 
even if one appends the adjective “terrorist” in front of “speech.” 
If the goal is to provide legal means for reducing the reach of 
particular kinds of speech that terrorist organizations (or individuals 
engaged in the plotting of terrorist acts) can perform, then policy 
makers must precisely define what speech to excise from the public 
sphere. However, any proscription must comply with Supreme Court 
doctrine outlining permissible regulations on free speech—such as 
speech that qualifies as “incitement” based upon its content and 
context. And in this way, speech that qualifies as “incitement” can be, 
and is, proscribed by U.S. law,52 but what might rise only to the level of 
propaganda remains protected. If “terrorist speech” means the speech 
of persons who are members of State Department designated terrorist 
organizations, or if it also includes the speech of individuals who may 
plot and perpetrate a terrorist act, then much of that speech will be 
protected, though some may be proscribed. As we have seen, speech that 
is aimed at providing material support for terrorism is unprotected 
given compelling government interests, but independent speech that 
might advance the goals of a designated foreign terrorist organization 
is not. Material support includes both the content of the speech and the 
manner in which it is expressed. 
The difficulty is in drawing lines in a way that proscribes all and 
only that speech forming “no essential part of the exposition of ideas”53 
 
 51. See, e.g., Scott Wilson, Greg Miller, & Sari Horwitz, Boston Bombing Suspect Cites U.S. 
Wars as Motivation, Officials Say, WASH. POST, April 23, 2013. 
 52. Statutory protections exist against acts of genocide and the incitement to engage in such 
acts. 18 U.S.C. § 1091(c) (proscribing conduct that “directly and publicly incites another to violate” 
the basic prohibition of genocide as defined in subsection (a) of the statue). 
 53. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
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and that does not empower government with tools to suppress dissent.54 
A central First Amendment principle is that speech must be granted 
ample “breathing space”55 in order to uphold the commitment to 
“uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”56 public debate. The very 
articulation of the problem is difficult, not simply because Professor 
Tsesis fails to provide any clear specifications of the speech to be 
proscribed, but because the conceptual tools that might make it possible 
to excise all and only “terrorist” related speech run into the problem of 
either proscribing or chilling protected political speech. 
Turning to a concrete example, any attempt to proscribe 
“terrorist speech” using the model of the United Kingdom, which might 
serve as a useful comparison, would be impermissible under the First 
Amendment. The U.K. Terrorism Act of 2006 prohibits the expression 
of “a statement that is likely to be understood by some or all of the 
members of the public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect 
encouragement or other inducement to them to the commission, 
preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism or [other] offences.”57 In 
addition, a person who “distributes or circulates a terrorist publication” 
can be punished.58  Moreover, a statement that could be construed as 
“glorification” of terrorism would count as “encouragement.”59 Such an 
approach to criminalizing “terrorist speech” might be one model for 
criminalizing “menacing dogmas” or “radical propaganda” that might 
constitute “encouragement,” but would violate the First Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution. Not only are the U.K. statutory provisions too 
vague and overbroad for purposes of U.S. free speech doctrine—
“glorification,” for example, is a vague term—but they also proscribe 
speech that merely advocates violence or “dangerous ideas,” without 
creating sufficient danger of bringing them about.60 
At a more abstract level, to conceptualize speech as “terrorist 
speech” depends on prior factual judgments subject to 
political contestation and articulated against the background of First 
 
 54. Protecting dissent has an important role to play in First Amendment jurisprudence. See 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT (2003). 
 55. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
 56. Id. at 272. 
 57. The Terrorism Act 2006, ch. 11, (Eng.). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. During an earlier period, the First Amendment would have asked whether such speech 
created a “clear and present danger” of bringing about illegal action, see Gitlow v. New York, 268 
U.S. 652 (1925), latter modified by an “imminent lawless action” standard in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 
395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). The U.K. prohibition is too broad to survive either of these standards. 
Crocker_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/31/2017  1:40 PM 
2017] FREE SPEECH AND TERRORIST SPEECH 59 
Amendment doctrine.61 The question whether a particular kind of 
speech is sufficiently “dangerous” to warrant censorship is subject to 
political and interpretive arguments that always risk drawing a line in 
a way that harms the very political system it aims to protect. It invites 
more searching investigations into speakers’ communicative content 
rather than their intentions combined with overt acts. Having once 
defined forbidden “terrorist speech” in a particular political context, 
policy makers might respond to a future terrorist attack by seeking to 
apply the prohibition to broader categories of speech.  No doubt, courts 
can check prosecutorial zeal, but the mere pursuit of broader categories 
of speech, apart from ultimate judicial determinations, can chill 
otherwise protected expressive activity. Moreover, in the wake of a 
future attack, executive officials will claim national security necessity, 
and there is no guarantee that courts will serve as an effective check 
against the zealous application of “terrorist speech” to broader 
categories of speech expressive of dissent and dissatisfaction.62 That, at 
least, is one lesson from the series of cases from Schenk and Debs during 
the first World War to Dennis during the Cold War that eventually lead 
to Brandenburg in 1969.  Courts have been more willing to defer to 
executive claims to punish speech when the public danger is more 
salient and more likely to impose constitutional constraints as the 
perceived threat recedes. Given the indefiniteness in the 
conceptualization of “terrorist speech,” it would be more prudent to 
forestall a future cycle of zealous prosecution and subsequent rights 
reassertions by resisting the temptation to proscribe “terrorist speech” 
in the first place.  Instead, policy makers should focus on addressing 
overt acts made in pursuit of terrorist objectives. 
In sum, prohibiting “terrorist speech” requires unattainable 
precision in both conceptualization and statutory construction. The 
Supreme Court’s struggle with obscenity provides a useful analogy. 
Although obscenity is no part of the exposition of ideas, the Court all 
but abandoned the attempt to specify precisely what constitutes 
obscenity in practice.63  Because “terrorist speech” may often be 
intertwined with political and religious expression, conceptualizing and 
applying prohibitions will be made all the more difficult.  Moreover, 
when conceptualizations are imprecise, the task of separating political 
advocacy from genuine incitement grants a tool to executive officials 
ready-made for over use and abuse. 
 
 61. See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Case Study in 
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2005). 
 62. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK (2006). 
 63. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
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III. THE PROBLEM WITH DANGEROUS IDEAS 
Given these cautionary considerations, advocating for additional 
regulations aimed at suppressing an amorphous conception of “terrorist 
speech” itself constitutes a dangerous idea. 
Is “terrorist speech” the new communist menace? In Dennis, the 
Supreme Court considered speech said to be criminal by virtue of its 
advocacy. The Court conducted a cost-benefit analysis to conclude that 
the gravity of the global communist threat during the Cold War 
warranted deference to the asserted security interests of the state.64 
Using the “clear and present danger” test, the Dennis Court found that 
preventative action is warranted when a group aims to overthrow the 
government and is “attempting to indoctrinate its members and to 
commit them to a course” of action designed to bring about a violent 
end.65 A person who “knowingly or willfully advocates, abets, advises, 
or teaches the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing 
or destroying the government of the United States,”66 in conjunction 
with a group sharing a similar goal, poses some danger—particularly 
where the goal is the violent overthrow of government. 
The difference between the Cold War communist and the 
(post)modern terrorist requires some parsing when considering a basis 
on which the “clear and present danger” of harm from terrorist speech 
could justify a longer temporal horizon for government censorship and 
punishment. One difference is the degree of potential harm that might 
follow from the two different kinds of threats. A global communist 
conspiracy constituted an existential threat to the U.S. government. By 
contrast, as harmful as the murderous aims of terrorist plots might be, 
they do not constitute a threat to the sovereign existence of U.S. 
constitutional government.67 Another key difference is the development 
of more robust free speech protections in the aftermath of Dennis. 
Consider the Court’s abandonment of its more deferential stance—
overturning convictions for lesser Communist Party officials in Yates v. 
United States68 because the advocacy in question was “too remote from 
concrete action to be regarded as the kind of indoctrination preparatory 
to action” that could constitute proscribable speech.69 With the Supreme 
Court’s turn to protecting and facilitating robust public debate in cases 
 
 64. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). See also ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN 
VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 128–29 (2007). 
 65. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 509. 
 66. The Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385. 
 67. See ACKERMAN, supra note 62, at 13–77. 
 68. 354 U.S. 298 (1957). 
 69. Id. at 321–22. 
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like New York Times v. Sullivan and Brandenburg, a core First 
Amendment concern is that by criminalizing advocacy alone, we risk 
inhibiting the exposition of ideas. Even if some ideas can be 
conceptualized as “menacing,” the theory of the First Amendment 
imbedded in Brandenburg and reaffirmed in Whitcomb70 but first 
articulated in Justice Holmes’ dissent in Gitlow v. New York is that 
“[e]very idea is an incitement.”71 Moreover, every idea “offers itself for 
belief,”72 and in turn, belief can lead to action. 
These bulwarks of the American free speech tradition are built 
in part out of conceptions of free speech values that protect democratic 
self-determination,73 autonomy,74 cultural democracy,75 or simply 
dissent.76 While each of these free speech theories might favor different 
outcomes in particular cases, they share a common concern for 
protecting “robust, uninhibited, wide-open” speech, which is threatened 
when advocacy becomes prohibited. While these kinds of free speech 
values do not endorse the content of speech that glorifies terrorist 
attacks, neither do they readily justify its criminal exclusion—for a 
primary aim of free speech doctrine is to provide both the breathing 
room and the cultural conditions for alternative ideas to win out by 
choice rather than compulsion.77 If doctrine unreflectively 
accommodates the countervailing value of security as a justification for 
excising speech that spreads dangerous propaganda or menacing 
dogmas, then the problem is that security might always be improved on 
a claim of national necessity.78 But the burden must remain on those 
seeking censorship to justify the specific security gains to be achieved 
against the specific free speech values the First Amendment protects. 
Otherwise, constitutional review becomes a way of vindicating prior 
political conceptions of speech designated dangerous. 
Those seeking to improve security by regulating speech might 
hasten to object to what seems in this essay a far too high-minded 
consideration for speech that justifies killing civilians. After all, they 
 
 70. Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441 (1974); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 
U.S. 444 (1969). 
 71. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 72. Id. 
 73. See, e.g., OWEN FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1996); Robert C. Post, Participatory 
Democracy as a Theory of Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477 (2011). 
 74. See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989). 
 75. See Balkin, supra note 3, at 3. 
 76. See, e.g., Thomas P. Crocker, Displacing Dissent: The Role of Place in First Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2587 (2007). 
 77. As the Court has explained: “If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First 
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because 
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). 
 78. See generally, Thomas P. Crocker, Who Decides on Liberty?, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1511 (2012). 
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might object, the real harm is the loss of security caused by terrorist 
speech aiming to indoctrinate and recruit. But beyond the issue of 
conceptualizing the problem to be addressed and the speech to be 
prohibited, there is the practical problem of what good such regulations 
might do.   
Suppose that under a suitably refined statute, a person could be 
prosecuted for posting to a social media site her approval of an Anwar 
al-Awlaki video exhorting the desirability and urgency of killing 
civilians in furtherance of Jihad. Would making a criminal out of such 
a social media speaker render the underlying video inaccessible? The 
answer is clearly no, though it might marginally decrease its 
circulation. Rather, its most immediate effect would be to give 
government officials far greater power to censor expressive activity 
even if it were disconnected from any intent to further specific terrorist 
acts. But is expressing admiration for such views by a social media 
speaker indicative of an intent to carry out violent acts? It is hard to see 
how, though posting such material—apart from the possibility of 
violating an internet provider’s terms of service—might warrant 
greater scrutiny of the speaker given the National Security Agency’s 
known access to social media content.79 Protections against “guilt by 
association” are meant to prevent the punishment of speech based on 
membership or proclivity absent evidence of specific intent to engage in 
illegal actions.80 If the goal is to make the internet unavailable to 
terrorist organizations themselves, then given the criminal nature of 
their underlying endeavor (e.g., conspiring to engage in acts of 
terrorism), it is also difficult to see how criminalizing their members’ 
speech adds any new additional deterrent or counterterrorism tool. By 
requiring speech regulations to cohere with underlying free speech 
values, one goal is to avoid chilling even marginal political speech in the 
name of criminalizing putatively dangerous speech. 
Perhaps the real issue, then, is justifying an approach that 
inevitably leads to a revision of section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act, which provides legal protection for social media websites 
and other providers of internet platforms and content.81 The logic might 
be to make a broad category of terrorist speech illegal, and then argue 
that such a law is toothless unless providers of internet services can be 
 
 79. See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to User Data 
of Apple, Google and Others, THE GUARDIAN, June 7, 2013 (“The National Security Agency has 
obtained direct access to the systems of Google, Facebook, Apple and other US internet giants . . . 
.”). 
 80. See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 228–30 (1961). 
 81. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated 
as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”). 
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forced to take down content on pain of criminal liability. Such an 
approach would have profound reverberations for the integrity of 
internet services as fora for expressive activities of all kinds—personal 
and political. But if this is the ultimate logic of Professor Tsesis’ 
proposal, he still needs to justify the initial step of criminalizing 
“terrorist speech” without running afoul of both First Amendment 
doctrine, and importantly, constitutionally protected free speech 
values. It matters to these values not simply that fora for public 
discussion, such as social media, remain open and uninhibited by state 
censorship, but that both the outcome and process of debate “preserve 
an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately 
prevail.”82 
If contributing to public debate and seeking to have a voice in 
the formation of public opinion were seen as First Amendment values 
that do not include “terrorist speech” under some suitable 
categorization, then prioritizing security need not entail free speech 
loss. On this view, it is appropriate to balance security and liberty, and 
during periods in which there are sustained threats from terrorism, 
adjustments to that balance in the direction of greater security are 
warranted.83 This logic provides a justification for criminalizing non-
violent “terrorist speech” to the extent that it poses a security threat 
that outweighs any residual value it retains as political expression.  
Such logic focused on the content of speech, however, does not account 
for deliberative values that exist independently of the specific content 
of speech. The process of deliberation within the “market place of ideas” 
is a bulwark against enforced conformity and a protection for the 
legitimacy of outcomes obtained free from official interference.84 
But what if Congress were able to ban all and only that speech 
which is both accurately characterized as “terrorist speech” and is truly 
dangerous? What if as a result, we could create a system of 
participatory self-government that provides just the right mix of 
information to yield optimal democratic decisions?  Posit the existence 
of a knowable “optimality” that can be judged from a perspective 
 
 82. Red Lion Broad. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). 
 83. See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 67, at 26–30; RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE 
PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY  9 (2006) (“In times of danger, the 
weight of concerns for public safety increases relative to that of liberty concerns, and civil liberties 
are narrowed.”) 
 84. On the dangers of enforced conformity, see West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 
(1943) (“ If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or 
pretty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of 
opinion.”); see also, Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27 
CONST. COMMENTARY 283, 283 (2011) (arguing that “[w]e should understand freedom of speech as, 
centrally, protecting freedom of thought.”). 
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external to the system, taking into account the mixture of desires, 
preferences, and problems individuals prioritize. Judged from the 
perspective of the “optimal” result, would it be permissible to excise 
from public discourse any and all speech that fails to contribute to the 
optimal result? To make the claim a bit more pressing, posit that failure 
to excise such speech would not only lead to suboptimal results, but 
would also lead to positive, even grave, harms. When terrorist speech is 
included, it is not simply the case that we end up in a non-Pareto 
optimal position. What makes the non-optimality discernible is both an 
increased risk of actual physical harm to some number of individuals 
and the likely eventuality that some number will suffer death and 
physical harm from terrorist actions in part because of this speech. So, 
a democratic polity’s failure to take action to excise the offending speech 
will lead to harms of a kind that—if avoided—would produce a more 
optimal outcome. Why not construe the First Amendment to allow such 
speech to be excised from the public sphere? 
Not only is proscribing speech on the basis of its content not 
precise in the manner imagined, but democratic process and legitimacy 
are values protected by the First Amendment, regardless of the 
efficiency of the outcome.  Government efforts to achieve Pareto 
optimality by criminalizing content it claims constitutes “terrorist 
speech” undermine these values. Perhaps this problem is even more 
accentuated by the fact that social media is a new fora for democratic 
exchange—the future shape and impact of which has yet to be seen.85 
When Congress attempted to regulate the content of internet 
communication under the Communications Decency Act or the Child 
Online Protection Act, the Supreme Court was not sympathetic to 
premature and imprecise attempts.86 The tension between 
the conditions of democratic legitimacy and the ever-present 
temptation to excise “dangerous ideas,” should caution against 
pursuing greater security by regulating speech. But, all too often—and 
it seems to be the case with an attempt to regulate terrorist speech on 
social media—there is a substantial risk of conceptualizing what is to 
be proscribed in terms too readily amenable to expansion and with goals 
too imprecisely conceived.   
Post-September eleventh counterterrorism policy has 
challenged a number of constitutional protections and prior statutory 
 
 85. The new role of social media is before the Court in State v. Packingham, 748 S.E.2d 146, 
149 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013), rev’d, 777 S.E.2d 738 (N.C. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 368 (2016). 
 86. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (holding unconstitutional two provisions that 
sought to prohibit indecent or patently offensive content on the internet viewable by minors); 
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) (holding unconstitutional provisions of the Child Online 
Protection Act). 
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frameworks by expanding executive power. For example, surveillance 
practices have tested the outer limits of Fourth Amendment protections 
while exceeding initial statutory limits provided by Congress under the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.87 In secret processes, executive 
officials have engaged in practices that surpass legal frameworks, only 
to later seek Congressional authorization with modifications to protect 
constitutional rights.   
One area that has been challenged less is the First Amendment. 
The USA Patriot Act’s amended material support statute is the 
significant exception, but even there, the Court in Humanitarian Law 
Project deferred to executive claims, putatively applying strict scrutiny 
in allowing restrictions on coordinated speech while preserving 
protections for independent speech.88  But future events could find a 
receptive presidential administration ready to expand internet speech 
restrictions, even perhaps going so far as “closing that internet up in 
some way” as President Donald Trump warned.89 The attitude 
executive officials take toward free speech values might be an even 
more worrisome indicator of a willingness to abide by First Amendment 
constraints on counterterrorism policy. As a candidate, President 
Trump followed up his suggestion about “closing up” the internet by 
considering the objection that “[s]omebody will say, ‘Oh freedom of 
speech, freedom of speech.’ These are foolish people.”90 
 
 87. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 101, 92 Stat. 1783 
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–11 (2000)).  Under President Bush, the National 
Security Agency embarked on a widespread “Terrorist Surveillance Program.” See James Risen & 
Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1. It 
was later justified on grounds of national security. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Legal Authorities 
Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the President, p. 3 (Jan. 
19, 2006) (“The primary responsibility, and therefore the power, to ensure the security of the 
United States in situations of grave and unforeseen emergencies. Intelligence gathering is a 
necessary function that enables the President to carry out that authority.”); see also, Eric 
Lichtblau, In Secret, Court Vastly Broadens Powers of NSA, NY TIMES, July 6, 2013, at A1 (Using 
the “special needs” “concept more broadly, the FISA judges have ruled that the N.S.A.’s collection 
and examination of Americans’ communications data to track possible terrorists does not run afoul 
of the Fourth Amendment, the officials said.”). 
 88. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (holding that the material 
support prohibition could constitutionally apply to “speech under the direction of, or in 
coordination with foreign groups.”); see also Aziz Z. Huq, Preserving Political Speech from 
Ourselves and Others, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 16 (2012). 
 89. David Goldman, Donald Trump wants to ‘close up’ the Internet, CNN (DEC. 8, 2015), 
http://money.cnn.com/2015/12/08/technology/donald-trump-internet/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/Z6PH-PVCJ]. 
 90. Id.  Although it might be tempting to disregard such candidate statements as campaign 
rhetoric, a pattern has emerged in the initial weeks of the Trump Administration of executive 
officials attempting to conform policy to Tweets or similar statements. See David Sanger, et 
al., Turmoil at the National Security Council, From the Top Down, NY TIMES, Feb. 13, 2017, at 
A1 (“Three weeks into the Trump administration, council staff members get up in the morning, 
read President Trump’s Twitter posts and struggle to make policy to fit them.”). 
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Increased internet regulation as a counterterrorism policy 
consists of three elements: statutory authorization, judicial deference to 
executive security concerns, and a general constitutional sentiment 
that discounts the value of free speech.  Statutory authorization can 
further empower a disregard for constitutional values that give priority 
to free expression and democratic deliberation.  Further, this approach 
illustrates a contrasting constitutional vision that might survive 
judicial review during a perceived emergency circumstance—where the 
need to defer to national security expertise is the most compelling. 
Currently, two of the elements for increased internet regulation 
potentially exist—an apparent constitutional vision that sees free 
speech values as “foolish,” and judicial deference to the executive’s 
national security claims about “evolving threats in an area where 
information can be difficult to obtain and the impact of certain conduct 
difficult to assess.”91  The arguments for adding the missing statutory 
authorization, as well as expanding judicial deference to cover greater 
speech content, are factually deficient and theoretically dangerous.   
In sum, despite the surface appeal of balancing security and 
liberty in a way that might justify new prohibitions on speech 
communicated via the internet, a closer examination reveals a danger 
to constitutional values in returning to a conception of the First 
Amendment that allows punishing advocacy, no matter the 
offensiveness of the content. Not only is there no indication that such 
prohibitions will in fact improve security, but there is also every 
indication that they would endanger core free speech values that rely 
on democratic deliberation rather than the power of government 
censorship to ensure political safety. 
CONCLUSION 
If Americans remain committed to a central First Amendment 
value in protecting a “marketplace of ideas,”92 then they must follow 
where the ideas lead.93 The American political system can make this 
bet, on the belief in the power of its ideas to win out in the marketplace 
without the need for the heavy hand of the censor to advance the cause. 
 
 91. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 34. 
 92. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 745–46 (1978). The idea of the neutral 
marketplace of ideas was first articulated by Justice Holmes writing in dissent in Abrams v. 
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the ultimate good 
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas . . . that the best test of truth is the power of the 
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . .”). 
 93. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“If in the long 
run the beliefs expressed . . . are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces in the community, 
the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way.”). 
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No doubt terrorism will be a continuing threat in the Twenty-First 
Century.94 The attraction for some individuals to carry out specific acts 
will be realized in part through access to dangerous ideas conveyed 
through internet communications. But if Congress were to counter 
threats of terrorism by criminalizing speech that does no more than 
advocate, then not only might it needlessly adopt a dangerous 
qualification to core First Amendment values, but it also seems clear 
that government “has sufficient means at its disposal to prevent such 
behavior without adding the First Amendment to the fire,”95 as Justice 
Scalia, writing for the Court in a different context in R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 
admonished. It would be an important constitutional achievement not 
to incite an assault on the First Amendment by appeal to inchoate fears 
of terrorist speech on social media. Instead, Americans can vindicate 
their free speech tradition by promoting vigorous debate and dissent in 
the new digital fora the internet creates.  
 
 
 94. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT: THE WARS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY (2008). 
 95. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992). 
